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The development of organized, explanatory systems of knowledge is an
integral part of human nature; it allows us to categorize objects and events and to
make predictions based on our experiences. In our society, the quest for answers
to the questions "How?" and "Why?" begins early in life. By the preschool years,
children are actively seeking and providing explanations for an abundance of
physical and social events, and they are developing knowledge of causal forces at
work in the environment (Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982; Rosengren &
Hickling, 1999).
Paradoxically, at about the same age at which children demonstrate they
have a fundamental understanding of natural causal forces operating in the world,
they are introduced by our culture to concepts and beliefs that seem to contradict
their early theories. For example, children learn of popular superstitions (e.g., a
four-leaf clover bringing good luck) that employ causal mechanisms outside the
realm of natural laws governing the physical world. This concept raises the
question of whether or not children with a fairly sophisticated understanding of
normal causal forces believe in superstitions and, if so, how they reconcile these
supernatural beliefs with their knowledge of natural causal relations.

The aim of this study was to examine young children's understanding of
superstitions. Children between the ages of 5 and 9 received a set of interview
questions concerning their experiences with superstitions (e.g., "Do you know
what a superstition is?"); their beliefs about the efficacy of superstitions (e.g., "Do
superstitions always come true or just some of the time?"); and their knowledge
of the mental and physical components of superstitions (e.g., "Do you have to
believe it will come true for it to really happen?"). Participants also completed a
belief task designed to assess the relative importance of belief and action in
superstitions.
The findings indicate developmental patterns in children's awareness of
superstitions and beliefs in efficacy of superstitions. With age, children
demonstrated a significantly greater awareness of superstitions. In contrast,
children demonstrated a significant decrease in beliefs in the efficacy of
superstitions by the age of seven. Regarding children's perceptions of the
necessary components of superstitions, there were important similarities in the
developmental pattern of children's responses. Across all age groups, the action
component of a superstition (as opposed to the belief component) was found to be
the primary factor in the effectiveness of superstitions to "bring good luck."
These findings are discussed in relation to children's beliefs about magic,
wishing, and prayer, and the potential modes of cultural transmission of
supernatural beliefs.

Vll

Literature Review
An essential element of human nature is our quest to make sense of the
world. Individuals search for explanations about everything from the creation of
the earth to why the Yankee baseball pitcher pitched a no run game. Was it the
wind? Was it his lucky socks? Was it God? In our society, scientific evidence has
been hailed as the most accepted method of interpreting our wondrous world.
Both children and adults call on scientific reasoning to predict and explain events
in their environment. Through science, "we aim for objectivity: basing
conclusions on external validation. And we avoid mysticism: basing conclusions
on personal insights that elude external validation" (Shermer, 1997, p. 20).
At what point do young people begin using science as a means for
explaining events in the world? Research demonstrates that this knowledge can
be present even in early childhood. In fact, a growing body of empirical work
documents children's understanding of the scientific processes that function in the
world. For example, studies done by Leslie and Keeble (1987) and Cohen and
Oakes (1993) indicate that even infants have a general understanding of physical
causality. These studies systematically investigate infants' perceptions of
causality by presenting direct launching events in which one object moves across
a computer screen and hits a second object. The results suggest that infants as
young as 7 to 10 months of age demonstrate an ability to recognize causal
relationships among objects. Further research documented how preschoolers use
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their scientific knowledge of physical causality to predict and explain a multitude
of events (Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982; Goswami, 1991; Shultz, 1982).
With such evidence of children's basic understanding of scientific
principles, the questions arise as to when and why children use magic as a causal
explanation of events. Magical forces not only fall outside the realm of natural
causality but also violate children's early scientific principles. To better
understand the interplay between magical and scientific reasoning, it is important
to first define and explore the magical belief systems prevalent in our culture.
Oxford American Dictionaries (Abate, 1998) defines magic as being "a
supposed act of influencing the course of events supernaturally" (p. 359), and
defines supernatural as "thought to reveal some force above the laws of nature"
(p. 601). According to these definitions, magical belief systems may include — but
are not limited to — wishing, astrology, numerology, and superstition. Such belief
systems have existed for many centuries; for example, the superstitious act of
knocking on wood to promote a positive outcome is thought to have first
originated in Ancient Greece. Men of this time believed that trees housed spirits
and sought protection from evil by touching a tree (Marmor, 1956).
In America today, evidence of magical beliefs dominate our popular
culture (Gmelch & Felson, 1980; Rozin, Nemeroff, Wayne, & Sherrod, 1989).
Vyse (2000) notes that 1200 of the 1750 newspapers distributed throughout the
nation include astrological columns, and Gallop polls from 1994 report that 25%
of Americans believe in astrology. In addition, a multitude of television programs
and movies, such as the X-files, Ghost, Phenomenon, City of Angels, and The
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Sixth Sense, focus on paranormal forces such as aliens, ghosts, or Extra Sensory
Perception. This pervasive climate of magical and supernatural beliefs may have
direct consequences on the development of magical beliefs in children.
Recently, a number of investigators have focused on children's magical
beliefs and their use of magical explanations. Regarding children's beliefs in
magical entities, parental reports as well as verbal and behavioral measures of
young children's beliefs indicate that many children between the ages of 3 and 8
believe in magical beings such as Santa Claus, the Tooth Fairy, the Easter Bunny,
ghosts, and monsters (Harris, Brown, Marriot, Whittall, & Harmer, 1991; Johnson
& Harris, 1994; Rosengren & Hickling, 1994, 1999; Woolley, 1999). In addition,
another recently documented phenomenon involving magical beliefs is that of
children's imaginary companions. Estimates of the frequency of children having
imaginary companions range between 25% and 65%, with the highest incidence
occurring between 3 and 8 years of age (Singer & Singer, 1990; Taylor,
Cartwright, & Carlson, 1993). This information suggests a fundamental difference
between the way children and adults perceive the realm of magic.
However, when we look at the way in which children and adults use magic
as a causal explanation for real world physical events, the evidence indicates that
both adults and children resort to using magical explanations for events when they
have no apparent physical or scientific causal explanation. In a study by Phelps
and Woolley (1994), children between the ages of 4 and 8 were given a magical
belief interview and a series of event tasks. Data from the interview showed an
age-related decrease in children's beliefs in the real existence of magical entities
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(such as fairies) and magical powers. The event task was broken into two parts:
prediction and explanation. In the prediction section, children were asked to guess
what might happen in a particular scenario (e.g., magnets repelling one another, a
quarter "disappearing" in a box). In the explanation section, children were shown
the event about which they made a prediction and asked to explain the cause of
the event. There were four predictive variables: age; magical belief classification
(high, moderate, low—based on the interview responses); accurate predictions;
and availability of accurate physical explanations. Of the four variables, only the
final factor, that of having reasonable physical explanations for the events, was
found to account for a significant portion of the variance in children's claims of
magic. Thus, whether or not children claimed to believe in magical entities and
supernatural forces in the interview did not relate to their use of magic to explain
physical events. According to this study, children are similar to adults in that
when they have physical principles available to explain events they do not make
use of magical explanations.
So there appears to be a discrepancy between children's beliefs in magical
entities (which are numerous and robust) and their beliefs that magic is a force
operating in the real world (which is limited). In line with this difference, an
additional distinction needs to be made between what children call "magical" and
children's beliefs and actions that we, as adults, may call magical because they
violate our understanding of natural causal forces. Piaget (1929) defined
children's "magical thinking" from this adult perspective as a broad category of
mental and physical acts that include several sub-categories: (a) "magic by
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participation between thoughts and things" (e.g., wishing for a new bike and
getting one); (b) "magic by participation between actions and things" (e.g.,
crossing your fingers and winning a lottery); and (c) "magic by participation
between objects" (e.g., finding treasure buried under a four leaf clover).
According to Piaget, young children routinely engage in these forms of magical
thinking involving a misinterpretation of the underlying causes of physical events.
These forms of magical thinking have less to do with the "fairy and monster"
realm of magic than they do with wishing and superstitions.
Several recent developmental studies have focused on Piaget's first
category of magical thinking, "magic by participation between thoughts and
things." These studies address children's beliefs in the power of mental-physical
causality — that is, a mental act (e.g., imagining, wishing, or praying) having a
physical consequence in the real world. Conceptually, imagining, wishing, and
praying have a number of features in common, the most important being that they
all involve internal mental processes aimed at changing the external world in
some way.
Woolley and Phelps (1994) investigated young children's understanding
of imagination as an effective means of mental-physical causality. Forty-two
children between the ages of 3 and 5 participated in a task that included a verbal
and behavioral measure of their beliefs in the real existence of an imagined object.
The procedure involved having a child imagine or "make a picture in their head"
of an object inside an empty box. Children's belief in the existence of this object
were assessed verbally ("Is there tape in this box?" and "Is it real tape or pretend
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tape?"), and also behaviorally by testing if the child would hand the box with the
imagined object to an adult in need of the particular object. Results show a
difference between the beliefs and actions of young 3-year-olds as compared to
older 3-year-olds and 4- and 5-year-olds. Young 3-year-olds were more likely to
verbally affirm the existence of the imagined object in the box and to actually
hand over the box to the experimenter. However, a significant majority of all
subjects (ages 3-5) displayed a clear understanding of the nonexistence of the
imagined contents when assessed behaviorally. Woolley and Phelps (1994)
suggested that children under 4 years of age might experience confusion about
whether imagining or thinking can actually change physical reality.
Woolley, Phelps, Davis, and Mandell (1999) explored the connection
between mental acts and the physical world in a second type of magical causality
- wishing. In a two-part study involving 92 children between the ages of 3 and 6,
the researchers assessed children's beliefs in the efficacy and magical nature of
wishing. In one task, children were asked to state whether events were magical or
ordinary. The events included commonly portrayed magical events (e.g., frog
turning into a princess) and nonmagical events (e.g., flipping on a light switch and
a light coming on). Children also were asked if a wish coming true would be
magical or not magical. Results indicate that older children (5- and 6-year-olds)
classify wishing as a magical event, as do the younger children (3- and 4-yearolds); however, the majority of young children also purport that turning on the
light is magical. In accord with the findings from the magical belief study by
Phelps and Woolley (1994), when children are not equipped with scientific or
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physical explanations, they may be more likely to claim the event is magical.
Overall beliefs in the efficacy of wishing decreases in children between the ages
of 3 and 6.
A third form of mental-physical causality that has received recent attention
is prayer. Prayer is similar to imagining and wishing in that the objective is to
alter the world through a focused thought, but with prayer, there is the added
element of a divine intermediary, such as God. In a study by Woolley and Phelps
(2001), 3- to 8-year-old children were asked structured interview questions and
instructed to respond to tasks designed to assess their concepts of prayer. Children
were asked questions such as "How does God hear your prayers?" and "Who
makes your prayers come true?" In one task, children were asked to teach a
puppet how to pray. Researchers examined the mental and physical components
children reported as characteristic of prayer (e.g., bowing head, clasping hands,
thinking). The results support a clear developmental trend, with 3- and 4-yearolds claiming the physical aspects of prayer (closing eyes) are more important
than mental ones (thinking), and 7- and 8-year-old children claiming that mental
components are more important than the physical ones. Concerning beliefs in the
efficacy of prayer, at age 4, children begin having a general idea that prayer
"works" and this belief appears to increase through age 8.
Very little research has been done to address Piaget's second and third
categories of magical thinking: "participation between actions and things," and
"participation between objects and objects." These forms of magic are more
closely related to what we commonly view as superstitions, such as knocking on
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wood or picking a four leaf clover for good luck. Tobacyk (1991) describes
superstition as the tendency to create an "illusory correlation." He defines an
illusory correlation as one in which people imagine or overestimate relationships
between two variables. Similarly, Alcock (1995) defines superstition as "the
interpreting of two closely occurring events as though one caused the other,
without any concern for the causal link" (p. 15). A more culturally relativistic
definition suggests "superstition should be reserved for beliefs or practices
groundless in themselves and inconsistent with the degree of enlightenment
reached by the community to which one belongs" (Marmor, 1956, p. 119). While
this definition implies a very negative view of superstitions, it also allows for
knowledge and beliefs systems to evolve within a culture.
Alcock (1995) states that 19th century thinkers believed that universal
education would lead to a decrease in superstitious beliefs. However, he claims
that "high literacy rates and universal education have done little to decrease such
beliefs" (p. 15). Superstitious beliefs are evident in individuals with and without
formal education as well as in both rural and urban areas. Vyse (2000) suggested
that people with a college education may be more likely to subscribe to social and
occupational-specific superstitions, such as exam or business related superstitions.
Blum (1976) reported that within American society as a whole, there is abundant
evidence of beliefs in many common superstitions (e.g., walking under a ladder
brings bad luck, crossing your fingers brings good luck).
Why are these beliefs so prevalent in a culture that strongly supports
scientific methods of inquiry and scientific explanations? Anthropologist
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Bronislaw Malinowski suggests the "theory of the gap" to explain the ubiquity of
superstitious beliefs and acts (as cited in Campbell, 1996). His theory states that
despite our vast array of scientific knowledge, uncertainty still exists regarding
the underlying causes of many events, and this uncertainty leads people to
experience anxiety about the unknown. When an individual lacks control, feels
uncertain, or is without information about the outcome of an event, he/she may be
more prone to superstitious beliefs and behavior (Jahoda, 1969; Keinan, 1994).
For example, a student who feels anxious about taking an exam may feel
compelled to pick up a penny off the floor, in hopes that it will bring good luck.
Similarly, a first time flyer might knock on wood after hearing a flight attendant
boast of that airline's safety record. These acts permit the individual to gain some
sense of control over an uncertain outcome. As Zeiler (1972) states, "superstition
refers to behaviors which are emitted as if they have environmental consequences,
but in fact do not" (p. 2).
A perfect example of this type of behavior is evidenced in a study
conducted by Rozin, Markwith, & Ross (1990). Adult subjects were given two
glasses of water. The subjects observed sugar being added into each glass and
then instructed to place labels on the glasses: one read CYANIDE and the other
read SUGAR. When encouraged to drink from both glasses, subjects consistently
preferred to drink from the glass labeled SUGAR. Despite placing the labels on
each glass themselves, people avoided the water labeled CYANIDE due to the
fear of a possible link between the liquid and the poison.
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As adults, these illusory correlations may be compelling, even though our
rational side refutes them. Campbell (1996) utilizes the idea of a half-belief to
explain this phenomenon. He describes individuals who may negate the idea of
bad luck, but purposely avoid walking under a ladder. Oftentimes, he claims,
people may realize that a belief is irrational or unjustifiable, yet still perform the
superstitious act. If there is a high cost to performing the act (e.g., people are
watching, or it is difficult to walk around the ladder in a particular setting), one is
less likely to do it. However, if there is a low cost to behaving superstitiously
(e.g., no one is around, or it is just as easy to walk around the ladder as it is to
walk under it), people may choose the superstitious route just in case there may
be some type of causal connection.
These findings in the adult literature bring into question how children, like
adults, might employ superstitions in their struggle to make sense of and control
their world. To what extent are children knowledgeable of superstitions? Do they
view superstitions as a credible means of causality? What do children perceive to
be the roles of belief and action in superstitions? The purpose of this study is to
explore young children's understanding of superstitions and to further inform
three areas of development: (a) children's magical beliefs and use of magical
explanations, (b) children's magical thinking as defined by Piaget's three subcategories of magical thinking, and (c) children's superstitious beliefs and acts as
compared to those of the adult population. It is expected that children will exhibit
knowledge of superstitions later than they demonstrate knowledge of magical
entities and wishing, but about the same age as they begin forming concepts of
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prayer. It is unclear at this point whether children's beliefs in the efficacy of
superstitions will show a decline by the age of 9, as is the pattern with magical
beliefs and wishing, or if their beliefs will continue to increase through the early
elementary school years, as is evidenced with prayer.

Method
Participants
Participants in this study were 80 children between the ages of 4 and 9
with an equal number of males and females. The sample consisted of 25 4- to 5year-olds (mean age = 5;1; range = 4;7 - 5;7), 25 6- to 7-year-olds (mean age =
7;2; range = 6;7 - 7; 10), and 30 8- to 9-year olds (mean age = 9;2; range = 8;8 9;7). Children were recruited from two public schools. Each of the public schools
used in this study serves a population of students in which approximately 67%
meet eligibility for free and reduced lunch program. This study was approved by
the Human Subjects Review Board of Western Kentucky University (see
Appendix A).
Materials
Belief interview. The complete set of interview questions is included at
the end of this document (see Appendix B). Following the interview format used
in similar studies (e.g., Woolley & Phelps, 1994; Woolley & Phelps, 2001;
Woolley, et al., 1999), this survey was used to address children's knowledge of
and beliefs in superstitions. The subjects were given the opportunity to answer a
structured format of open-ended and forced choice questions concerning
superstitions. More specifically, questions probed children's knowledge of
superstitions, beliefs in the efficacy of superstitious acts, and understanding of the
necessary components (mental and/or physical) of superstitions. First, children
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were asked, "Do you know what a superstition or saying about luck is?"
(Question 1). If subjects answered this question affirmatively, they were asked,
"Can you explain what it is to me?" (Question 2), and "What would be an
example about something that brings good or bad luck?" (Question 3).
Participants also were asked: "Do you believe that is true?" "Has it ever happened
to you?" and "Did it really work?" (Questions 3a, 3b, 3c).
Children then were presented with the following sayings: "Step on a crack,
break your mother's back" and "Find a penny, pick it up, all day long, you'll have
good luck." Following each saying they were asked, "Have you ever heard of that
saying?" "Do you think that it is true?" "Have you ever done that?" and "Did it
really work?" (Questions 4a-d, 5a-d). Next, children were asked, "Can you think
of any other special beliefs or sayings that bring good or bad luck?" (Question 6).
Children's concepts of luck were further explored in Questions 7 - 1 5 :
"Do you think there is really such a thing as luck - having good luck or bad
luck?" "What are some examples of things that might happen if you have good
luck?" "What are some things that might happen if you have bad luck?" "Can
anyone have good luck?" "Do some people have more good luck than other
people, or is it even? If so, then who?" "What do you have to do to get good
luck?" "Can anyone have bad luck?" "Do some people have more bad luck than
other people, or is it even? If so, then who?" "What do you have to do to get bad
luck?"
Children were asked if they had heard of a number of objects bringing
good luck (four leaf clovers, rubbing a rabbit's foot, knocking on wood, a pencil,
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crossing your fingers, a horseshoe, and the number seven - Question 16a-g) and of
a number of objects bringing bad luck (breaking a mirror, stepping on a spider,
walking under a ladder, black cat crossing one's path, touching a window, spilling
salt, and the number thirteen - Question 17a-g). Neutral items (i.e., a pencil
bringing good luck and touching a window bringing bad luck) were included in
the lists to insure children were not always responding affirmatively. If subjects
had heard of the specific objects bringing good or bad luck, they were asked about
its efficacy: "Do you think it really works?" Participants also were asked, "Do
special beliefs or sayings for luck always come true or just some of the time?"
(Question 18).
To evaluate children's perceptions of the mental and physical components
of superstitions, they were asked, "Do you have to really believe it will work for it
to come true?" (Question 19), and "When special beliefs come true, is it because
somebody does something to make it come true, or because it just happens?"
(Question 20).
Final items assessed whether children believed people or things (kids,
grown-ups, babies, cats and dogs, flowers, and tables) can have knowledge and
beliefs regarding luck (Questions 21a-f, 22a-f).
Belief task. The belief task protocol and stimuli are included at the end of
this document (see Appendix C and Appendix D). The belief task was
administered immediately following the interview. The main objective of this task
was to determine the perceived relative importance of mental (belief) and/or
physical (action) components of superstition in order for a desired outcome to
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occur. Twelve scenarios were presented in random order. The characters in each
scenario were engaged in one of the following behaviors: picking up a penny,
picking a four-leaf clover, and crossing fingers. All three superstitions were
presented in each of the following four ways: no belief/action, belief/no action,
belief/action, and no belief/no action. The following were examples of one set of
scenarios: "This is Juanita. She is sitting on a bench. Juanita sees a penny on
heads. She does not believe that picking up a penny on heads will bring good
luck. She reaches down and picks up the penny, anyway." (no belief/action);
"This is Holly. She is going to school. Holly sees a penny on heads. She believes
that picking up a penny on heads will bring good luck. She has to go to school, so
she does not pick up the penny." (belief/no action); "This is Tony. He is walking
to the park. Tony sees a penny on heads. He believes that picking up a penny on
heads will bring good luck. He walks over to the penny and picks it up."
(belief/action); and "This is Darren. He is going to his friend's house. Darren sees
a penny on heads. He does not believe that picking up a penny on heads will bring
good luck. He walks away from the penny without picking it up." (no belief/no
action). As a memory check, children were asked if the character (a) believed in
the superstition, and (b) performed the superstitious act. The children then were
asked to predict if the character would have good luck.
Procedure
An informed consent document (see Appendix E) was distributed to
potential subjects in preschool, first, and third grades. Those who returned this
form received WKU pencils regardless of whether their parents allowed them to
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participate in the study. Only students whose parents consented participated in
the study.
Two graduate and two undergraduate students were trained on the
standardized administration of the belief interview and the belief task. Prior to
conducting the belief interview and task, each examiner demonstrated proficiency
in testing procedures. Interrater reliability was successfully performed during
practice administration sessions. The four examiners were grouped in two pairs
of reader and scribe to conduct the interviews and tasks.
Within the schools, children were individually removed from their
classrooms and led to a quiet area for a 15- to 20-minute session. Time was first
spent establishing rapport with each subject followed by the belief interview and
the belief task.

Results
Children's Awareness of Superstition
Data were omitted for two 4-year-old participants due to their inability or
unwillingness to respond to the interview or tasks. In the belief interview,
children first were asked, "Do you know what a superstition or saying about luck
is?" (Question 1); only 22% of all children answered this question with a response
of "yes." When presented with specific superstitious objects, many children
reported having heard of the object bringing good luck.

analyses (p < .05)

indicate no significant age differences for five of the seven superstitions
presented. Collapsed across age, the following percentages of children claimed
that they had heard of these good luck superstitions: a lucky penny, 55%; rubbing
a rabbit's foot, 35%; a horse shoe, 48%; the number seven, 33%; and knocking on
wood, 16%. Analyses of children's responses to the same question regarding two
other superstitions indicated significant developmental differences for 5-, 7-, and
9-year olds, respectively for four leaf clovers, 40%, 92%, 97% and crossing your
fingers, 52%, 88%, 97%. In each of these patterns, the responses of the 5-yearolds were significantly different from the 7- and 9-year olds, but the 7- and 9-year
olds were not significant from one another (Fisher's PLSD, p < .001).
As a manipulation check for random positive response sets, a pencil was
included as a neutral item. Twenty-six percent of all children reported having
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heard that a pencil brings good luck. This high proportion of claims that pencils
are lucky may, in part, be due to children's familiarity with an episode of the
popular television program "Arthur" where the characters have a magic pencil.
Only four of the 81 children interviewed, all of which were in the 5-year-old
group, demonstrated positive response sets, in that they answered "yes" to having
heard of all eight good luck superstitions. The results from questions concerning
bad luck will be presented in a separate paper with a study designed to further
investigate children's knowledge and beliefs about bad luck.
In order to assess children's overall knowledge of superstitions, children
were assigned a total knowledge score. In questions 5a, 16a, 16b, 16c, 16e, 16f,
16g, children were asked if they had heard of particular objects bringing good
luck. Children's affirmative answers were scored as 2 for "don't know," 1 for
"maybe," and negative responses were coded 0 for "no." Adding the scores on
these seven questions yielded a total knowledge score, ranging from 0-14. Mean
total knowledge scores were 7.1, 7.8, and 9.6 for 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds
respectively. An ANOVA yielded significant main effects of age on knowledge.
Post Hoc tests indicate that knowledge increases significantly between the 5- and
9-year-olds, but not the 5- and 7-year-olds or between the 7- and 9-year-olds
(Fisher's PLSD,p<.05).
To evaluate another aspect of children's knowledge about superstitions,
children were asked about which entities know about and believe in superstitions.
There were no significant age differences in children's responses regarding
grown-ups, kids, and tables. Across all age groups, 70% of the children report that
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grown-ups know about these sayings and 53% of children claim that grown-ups
believe in these sayings. Fifty-five percent of all children report that kids know
about these sayings and 70% claim that kids believe in superstitions, whereas only
10% of children claim that tables have knowledge of superstitions and 13% state
that tables believe in superstitions. A developmental pattern emerged regarding
babies, cats and dogs, and flowers knowing about and believing in sayings for
good and bad luck (See Table 1 and 2). For each of these entities and objects,
there was a significant decrease in affirmative answers to both the knowledge and
belief questions from the 5-year-olds to the 7- and 9-year-olds (Fisher's PLSD, p
< .001). The older children were significantly less likely to claim that these
entities had knowledge of superstitions and believed they would really come true.
Table 1
Percentage of Responses Regarding Entities Having Knowledge of Luck
Children's Responses
No

Don't Know

Yes

30

15

55

All Ages3

20

10

70

5-year-olds

68

4

28

7-year-olds

92

4

4

9-year-olds

97

3

0

Entity
Kids
All Agesa

Grown-ups

Babies

20

Cats and Dogsb
5-year-olds

56

0

44

7-year-olds

96

4

0

9-year-olds

87

10

3

5-year-olds

56

0

44

7-year-olds

100

0

0

9-year-olds

93

3

3

All Ages3

88

Flowers

Tables
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a

Age groups were combined when no significant differences were found.

b

Decrease in affirmative answers were found from 5-year-olds to 7-and 9-year olds.

Table 2
Percentage of Responses Regarding Entities Having Beliefs in Luck
Children's Responses
Entity

No

Don't Know

Yes

18

13

70

35

13

53

48

4

48

80

12

8

83

7

10

Kids
All Ages3
Grown-Ups
All Ages3
Babiesb
5-year-olds
7-year-olds
9-year-olds
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Cats and Dogsb
5-year-olds

36

4

60

7-year-olds

84

4

12

9-year-olds

83

3

13

5-year-olds

40

0

60

7-year-olds

80

4

8

9-year-olds

97

0

3

All Ages"

88

0

13

Flowersb

Tables

a

Age groups were combined when no significant differences were found.

b

Decrease in affirmative answers were found from 5-year-olds to 7-and 9-year-olds.

Efficacy Beliefs
In addition to assessing children's knowledge of superstitions, the
interview was designed to assess children's beliefs in the efficacy of superstitions
- whether they would "really come true." Participants who responded
affirmatively to having heard of superstitions or sayings about good luck were
asked if they believed these sayings "really work" (5d, 16a2, 16b2, 16c2, 16e2,
16f2, 16g2). %2 analyses (p < .01) on children's affirmative responses indicate
developmental differences for three of the seven superstitions. For the 5-, 7-, and
9-year-olds, respectively, the percentages were as follows: four-leaf clovers, 28%,
56%, 72%; rubbing a rabbit's foot, 48%, 12%, 12%; and knocking on wood, 28%,
0%, 3%. There were no significant age differences for four of the seven items,
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thus the reported percentages are collapsed across the three age groups: finding a
penny, 26%; horse shoe, 28%; crossing your fingers, 45%; the number seven,
20%.

For these same seven questions, a total belief score was computed by
coding affirmative answers as 2, "don't know" or "maybe" as 1, and negative
responses as 0, for a possible 0-14 score. Mean total belief scores were as follows
for 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds, respectively: 11.7, 9.4, 9.1. An ANOVA yielded a
significant main effect of age on belief, F (2,77) = 6.562, p < .01. Post Hoc tests
indicate that beliefs in the efficacy of superstitions declined significantly between
the 5-year-olds and the 7-year-olds, and between the 5-year-olds and 9-year-olds,
but not between the 7- and 9-year-olds (Fisher's PLSD, p < .05). Analyses of the
belief interview questions indicate no significant effects of gender.
Necessary Components
In the belief task, children's understanding of the mental (i.e., belief) and
physical (i.e., action) components of superstition were assessed. Children were
presented with 12 scenarios, and after each scenario, they were asked three
questions. The first two questions were intended to be manipulation checks to test
whether subjects attended to the stories (e.g., "Did Juanita believe that picking up
a penny on heads would bring good luck?" and "Did Juanita pick up the penny on
heads?") The third question asked whether the good luck would really happen
(e.g., "Do you think Juanita will have good luck?") Responses to the second
question indicated children of all ages attended to the tasks (across all ages, 97%
answered correctly). However, ANOVAs yielded significant developmental

differences in children's accurate responses to the first memory check question
regarding the character's stated beliefs: no beftef/action sets, F(2,75) = 19.945, p
< .0001; the belief/no action sets, F(2,75) = 21.510, p < .0001; the belief/action
sets, F(2,75) = 6.329, p < .05; and the no belief/no action sets, F(2,75) = 3.678, p
< .05 (see Table 3). The youngest age group was significantly less accurate in
their ability to recall the story character's stated belief in each of the four
conditions of the 2(belief/no belief) x 2 (action/no action) design (Fisher's PLSD,
P < .05). They were especially poor in recalling this information in the two
conditions where action and belief were contradictory.
Table 3
Percentage of Children's Accurate Recollection of the Character's Belief
Age Group
Scenario

5-year-olds

7-year-olds

9 year-olds

Belief / Action

69

85

95

No Belief / Action

29

79

82

Belief / No Action

26

75

80

No Belief / No Action

69

93

95

Note. Significant differences were found between 5-year-olds and the 7- and 9year-olds for each scenario.
Developmental differences emerged in children's responses to the third
belief task question. In three of the four scenarios (belief/action, no belief/action,
and no belief/no action), 5-year-olds produced significantly more claims that good
luck events would occur than did 7- and 9-year old children (see Table 4). Older
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children were more inclined to respond "maybe" when asked if the good luck
would happen than were younger children (0%, 13%, 19%, for 5-, 7-, and 9-yearolds, respectively). In contrast to these age differences, there were important
similarities in the developmental patterns of children's responses. Across all age
groups, the belief/action scenarios produced the highest rate of affirmative
responses (82%, 67%, 63%) for 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds, respectively), followed by
the no belief/action scenarios (71%, 60%, 49% for 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds,
respectively). Scenarios with no action produced far fewer affirmative responses
(belief/no action, 32%, 23%, 40%; no belief/no action, 39%, 20%, and 14%, for
5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds, respectively). Analyses on belief task data indicate no
significant effects of gender.
Table 4
Percentage of Children's Claims that Good Luck Events Would Really Occur
Age Group
Scenario

5-year-olds

7-year-olds

9 year-olds

Belief / Action

82

67

63

No Belief / Action

71

60

49

Belief / No Action

32

23

40

No Belief / No Action

39

20

14

Discussion
The purpose of the present study is to explore the development of
children's knowledge and understanding of superstitions and their beliefs
regarding supernatural causal forces. The findings of this study document a
growing awareness of superstitions in the early elementary years. Although some
5-year-old children were familiar with specific superstitious objects and events,
there was increased familiarity with superstitions by 9 years of age. This
burgeoning knowledge is exemplified by a 9-year-old's comment, "I know what
good luck and bad luck is. If you find a four-leaf-clover, you get good luck. If
you break a mirror, you get 7 months bad luck." The acquisition of this
information may be due to a greater exposure to superstitions from parents,
siblings, peers, and media.
Even though the increase in knowledge is not evident until age 9, a
significant decrease in children's beliefs in efficacy appears earlier - by the age of
7. Although by this age, children still have a relatively limited awareness of
superstitions, they are beginning to develop skepticism about the ability of a
superstition to have an effect on the world. However, even with this skepticism,
some children, like adults, still continue to consider luck a possible means of
causality. As one 7-year-old explained, "Lacey has good luck because boys like
her"; another claimed, "People who have money are lucky." It appears that at
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times, children are more likely to use the general concept of luck than to buy into
formal superstitions such as "Find a penny, pick it up, all day long you'll have
good luck."
Why might children subscribe to the notion of luck? Recall that Campbell
(1996) described a half-belief as superstitions upheld even though they may
contradict one's rational beliefs in the chance that they have some causal effect on
the world. A 9-year-old described this uncertainty by saying a superstition is
"when you believe in something and it might work or not." Another 9-year-old
explained a superstition's limitations by stating that it only "works on little
things." With evidence of adults' half-beliefs (Campbell, 1996; Rozin, et al.,
1990), it is not surprising that children would adopt this approach. One child
described his reasoning for believing in the four-leaf-clover superstition as, "My
dad thinks it's good luck." Evidence of this developing uncertainty was also
apparent in the observed increase of the older groups' chosen response of
"maybe" when asked if the character in the belief task would have good luck. No
5-year-old children answered "maybe" to this question; whereas, 7-year-olds
answered "maybe" an average of 13% of the time and 9-year-olds did so 19% of
the time. The older children hesitated to declare full acceptance or denial of a
superstition's ability to be effective.
The results of the belief task indicate there was consistency across ages in
the purported necessity of action when determining if a superstition would really
occur (averaged across all three age groups: beliet7action, 70%; no belief/action,
59%; belief/no action, 32%; no belief/no action, 24% ). Notice that in scenarios
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involving action without belief, children claimed that it would really occur over
half of the time; whereas, they claimed so only a third of the time in belief
without action scenarios. As adults, we frequently engage in superstitious
behaviors while we concurrently admit to not believing in them (Blum, 1976;
Campbell, 1996; Rozin, et al., 1990). One could speculate that the physical
component of doing something - taking action - may give an individual more
confidence in the outcome of an event rather than simply proclaiming a belief.
An additional goal of this research is to investigate how children's
developing concepts of superstitions relate to Piaget's categories of magical
thinking. Previous studies of children's concepts of imagination, wishing, and
prayer (Woolley & Phelps, 1994; Woolley & Phelps, 2001; Woolley, et al., 1999)
addressed Piaget's first category of magical thinking, "magic by participation
between thoughts and things." The present study was specifically designed to test
Piaget's second and third categories, "magic by participation between actions and
things" and "magic by participation between objects and objects." In the study
conducted by Woolley et al. (1999), children demonstrated an awareness in
wishing as early as 3 to 4 years of age. This prevalence of knowledge in such
early years was also seen in studies on magical entities and magical powers
(Harris, et al., 1991; Rosengren & Hickling 1994, 1999). The present study
suggests that knowledge of superstitions appears later, between the ages of 7 and
9, similar to the pattern of children's knowledge of prayer (Woolley & Phelps,
2001).
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As regards children's belief in the efficacy of supernatural events, studies
on children's understanding of magic (Phelps & Woolley, 1994) and wishing
(Woolley, et al., 1999) suggest that children's beliefs in these processes working
in the real world decrease with age. A similar pattern emerges in this study of
superstitions; 7- and 9-year-olds are less likely to report that a superstition will
"really work" than 5-year-olds. Interestingly, the opposite pattern was found in
studies on prayer; children's beliefs in the efficacy of prayer increased through the
early elementary years. Undoubtedly, this increase is a function of prayer being
more strongly supported by our culture as an acceptable form of supernatural
influence. It would be striking to find a culture in which superstitions were more
accepted and encouraged by the adult population than religious beliefs and
practices. In this case, we would expect to find beliefs in prayer being almost
nonexistent and an increase with age in beliefs in the efficacy of superstitions.
Most often, children's beliefs will conform to the adult norm in the culture
surrounding them.
Limitations
A few limitations of this research should be noted. The order of the
response choices in four of the questions in the belief interview (Questions 11, 14,
18, and 20) may have influenced the subjects' responses. The options were
presented in only one order, and thus there may have been a preferred choice
based on ordering. In addition, a different selection of a good luck neutral item
(other than pencil) may have been more effective in identifying positive response
sets. Also, the demographics of each group (SES, race, and disabilities) were not
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recorded or analyzed, thus these findings may not be generalizable to the
population as a whole or to specific subgroups.
Future Research
The findings from this study add to our knowledge of children's
understanding and usage of magical belief systems. As evidenced by this
research, children become more aware of superstitions throughout their early
elementary years, but their beliefs in the power of superstitions having an effect
on the world decrease with age. Most of the participants across all ages in this
study rated action as the primary determinant of a superstition's effectiveness.
Additional research is needed to assess the origins of children's
knowledge and beliefs regarding superstitions. What is the relative importance of
parents, siblings, peers, and media in the formation of this knowledge? Regarding
individual differences, is the environment the primary determinant of children's
superstitious beliefs (children in the same environment have similar beliefs) or are
children differentially disposed to being "believers" (given the same
environmental exposure, some children will be skeptics whereas others will be
credulous.) Other factors potentially related to individual differences include
children's scientific knowledge, experiences with supernatural outcomes,
susceptibility to peer influence, fantasy proneness, and religiosity.
Previous studies (e.g., Phelps & Woolley, 1994) indicate children have a
natural proclivity to disbelieve in evil magical entities. Recognizing this
reservation in beliefs in negative entities and events, future research could
investigate the extent to which children believe in superstitions that result in bad
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luck. This researcher did not address children's beliefs in bad luck, but the
question of whether children have different beliefs in good versus bad luck is an
interesting one to examine.
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WKU
Dear Katrina:
1.

Your research project, "Young children's understanding of superstitions," was reviewed by the HSRB and it
has been determined that risks to subjects are: (1) minimized and reasonable; and that (2) research procedures
are consistent with a sound research design and do not expose the subjects to unnecessary risk. Reviewers
determined that: (1) benefits to subjects are considered along with the importance of the topic and that
outcomes are reasonable; (2) selection of subjects is equitable; and (3) the purposes of the research and the
research setting is amenable to subjects' welfare and producing desired outcomes; that indications of coercion or
prejudice are absent, and that participation is clearly voluntary.

2.

In addition, the IRB found that: (1) informed consent will be sought and documented from each prospective
subject. (2) Provision is made for collecting, using and storing data in a manner that protects the safety and
privacy of the subjects and the confidentiality of the data. (3) Appropriate safeguards are included to protect the
rights and welfare of the subjects.
a.

3.

Your research therefore meets the criteria of Expedited Review and is approved as Amendment 1
to the original application (HS01-78).

Please note that the institution is not responsible for any actions regarding this protocol before approval. If you
expand the project at a later date to use other instruments please re-apply. Copies of your request for human
subjects review, your application, and this approval, are maintained in the Office of Sponsored Programs at the
above address. Please report any changes to this approved protocol to this office. A Continuing Review
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Kindest regards.

Director, Office of Sponsored Programs and
Human Subjects Coordinator
c:

Human Subjects FileOl-78 Amendment 1

HSApprovalPhelpsHSO 1 -78 Amendment 1
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Appendix B
BELIEF INTERVIEW

Subject #
Birth date

Location
Exp. Initials

Hi. My name is
. What is your name? That's a nice name. Today I
have a game to play with you. And in this game I'm going to ask you some
questions and show you some pictures. The fun part of this is that there are no
right or wrong answers. It's not like a test, so you can say anything that you want.
Okay? Alright, here we go....
1.

Do you know what a superstition or a saying about luck is?
Yes
No
Other

2.

Can you explain what it is to me?

3. What would be an example of a saying about something that brings good or
bad luck?

3a. Do you believe that is true?
Yes
No
D/k
3b. Has it ever happened to you? (Have you ever done that?)
Yes
No
D/k
3c. Did it really work?
Yes
No
D/k
**** 4) IF NO RESPONSE TO QUESTION 1, ASK: What
break your mother's back."
4a. Have you ever heard of that saying?
Yes
4b.. Do you think that is true?
Yes
4c. Have you ever done that?
Yes
4d. Did it really work?
Yes
5)
5a.
5b.
5c.
5d.

about "Step on a crack,
No
No
No
No

D/k
D/k
D/k
D/k

What about "Find a penny, pick it up; all day long you'll have good luck."
Have you ever heard of that saying?
Yes
No
D/k
Do you think that is true?
D/k
Yes
No
Have you ever done that?
D/k
Yes
No
Did it really work?
D/k
Yes
No

6) Can you think of any other special beliefs or sayings that bring good luck or
bad luck?
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6a. Do you believe that is true?
Yes
No
6b. Has it ever happened to you? (Have you ever done that?)
Yes
No
6c. Did it really work?
Yes
No
6d. Do you believe that is true?
Yes
No

D/k
D/k
D/k
D/k

**** 7) Do you think there is really such a thing as luck—having good luck or bad luck?
Yes
No
D/k
8) What are some examples of things that might happen if you have good luck?

9) What are some examples of things that might happen if you have bad luck?

10) Can anyone have good luck?

Yes

No

D/k

11) Do some people have more good luck than other people, or is it even? Who?
More

Even

D/k

12) What do you have to do to get good luck?
13) Can anyone have bad luck?

Yes

No

D/k

14) Do some people have more bad luck thanMore
other people,Even
or is it even?
D/kWho?
15)What do you have to do to get bad luck?
16)Have you ever heard of four leaf clovers bringing good luck? Do you think it
really works? What about
16a. four leaf clovers
Works: Yes
No
D/K
Heard of it
16b. rubbing a rabbit's foot
D/k
Works: Yes
No
Heard of it
16c. knocking on wood
No
D/k
Heard of it
Works: Yes
16d. a pencil
Heard of it
Works: Yes
No
D/k
16e. crossing your fingers
Heard of it
Works: Yes
No
D/k
16f. a horse shoe
D/k
Heard of it
Works: Yes
No
16g. the number 7
Heard of it
D/k
Works: Yes
No
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17) Have you ever heard of breaking a mirror bringing bad luck? Do you think it
really works? What about
17a. breaking a mirror
D/k
Works: Yes
No
Heard of it
17b. stepping on a spider
D/k
Works: Yes
No
Heard of it
17c. walking under a ladder
D/k
No
Works: Yes
Heard of it
17d. black cat crossing path
D/k
Works: Yes
No
Heard of it
17e. touching a window
D/k
No
Works: Yes
Heard of it
17f. spilling salt
D/k
Works: Yes
No
Heard of it
17g. the number 13
D/k
No
Works: Yes
Heard of it
18) Do special beliefs or sayings for luck always come true, or just some of the
time?
Always
Sometimes
D/k
19) Do you have to really believe it will work for it to come true?
Yes
No
D/k
20) When special beliefs come true, is it because somebody does something to
make it come true, or because it just happens? Makes it
Just happens
D/k
20a. (If someone) Who does something to make it come true?

21) Who knows about special sayings for good or bad luck?
Yes
21a. Do kids know about them?
Yes
21b. Do grown-ups know about them?
Yes
21c. Do babies know about them?
21d. Do cats and dogs know about them? Yes
Yes
21e. Do flowers know about them?
Yes
21f. Do tables know about them?
22) Who believes that sayings for luck really come true?
22a. Do kids believe they come true?
22b. Do grown-ups believe they come true?
22c. Do babies believe they come true?
22d. Do cats and dogs believe they come true?
22e. Do flowers believe they come true?
22f. Do tables believe they come true?

No
No
No
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

D/k
D/k
D/k
D/k
D/k
D/k

No
No
No
No
No
No

D/k
D/k
D/k
D/k
D/k
D/k
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Appendix C
BELIEF TASK
Subject #
Birth date

Location
Exp. Initials

1. Juanita - no belief/action
Ql. Believe?
Yes
Q2. Action?
Yes
Q3. Really happen? Yes

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K

2. Holly - belief/no action
Ql. Believe?
Yes
Q2. Action?
Yes
Q3. Really happen? Yes

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K

3. Tony - belief/action
Ql. Believe?
Yes
Q2. Action?
Yes
Q3. Really happen? Yes

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K

4. Darren - no belief/no action
Ql. Believe?
Yes
Q2. Action?
Yes
Q3. Really happen? Yes

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K

5. Amanda - no belief/action
Ql. Believe?
Yes
Q2. Action?
Yes
Q3. Really happen? Yes

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K

6. Miriam - belief/action
Ql. Believe?
Yes
Q2. Action?
Yes
Q3. Really happen? Yes

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K

7. Riley
Ql.
Q2.
Q3.

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K

8. Malcolm - no belief/no action
Ql. Believe?
Yes
No
Q2. Action?
Yes
No

Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K

- belief/no action
Believe?
Yes
Action?
Yes
Really happen? Yes

Q3. Really happen? Yes

No

Maybe

D/K

9. Yolanda - belief/no action
Ql. Believe?
Yes
Q2. Action?
Yes
Q3. Really happen? Yes

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K

10. Sarah - no belief/no action
Ql. Believe?
Yes
Q2. Action?
Yes
Q3. Really happen? Yes

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K

11. David - belief/action
Ql. Believe?
Yes
Q2. Action?
Yes
Q3. Really happen? Yes

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K

12. Erik - no belief/action
Ql. Believe?
Yes
Q2. Action?
Yes
Q3. Really happen Yes

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K
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Appendix D
Belief Task Stimuli Text
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Appendix D
TEXT TO ACCOMPANY THE PENNY PICTURES:
1) no belief, action
This is Juanita. She is sitting on a bench.
Juanita sees a penny on heads. She does not believe that picking up a penny
on heads will bring good luck.
She reaches down and picks up the penny, anyway.
2)

belief, no action
This is Holly. She is going to school.
Holly sees a penny on heads. She believes that picking up a penny on heads
will bring good luck.
She has to go, so she does not pick up the penny.

3)

belief, action
This is Tony. He is walking to the park.
Tony sees a penny on heads. He believes that picking up a penny on heads
will bring good luck.
He walks over to the penny and picks it up.

4)

no belief, no action
This is Darren. He is going to his friend's house.
Darren sees a penny on heads. He does not believe that picking up a penny
on heads will bring good luck.
He walks away from the penny without picking it up.

TEXT TO ACCOMPANY THE FOUR LEAF CLOVER PICTURES:
1)

no belief, action
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This is Amanda. She is sitting on a grassy hill.
Amanda sees a four-leaf clover. She does not believe that picking a four leaf
clover will bring good luck.
She reaches down and picks the clover, anyway.
2)

belief, action
This is Miriam. She is playing in her backyard.
Miriam sees a four-leaf clover. She believes that picking a four leaf clover
will bring good luck.
She picks the clover from the grass.

3)

belief, no action
This is Riley. He is going to his piano lesson.
Riley sees a four-leaf clover. He believes that picking a four leaf clover will
bring good luck.
He has to hurry, so he does not pick the clover.

4)

no belief, no action
This is Malcolm. He is walking his dog.
Malcolm sees a four-leaf clover. He does not believe that picking a four leaf
clover will bring good luck.
He does not stop to pick the clover.

TEXT TO ACCOMPANY THE CROSSING FINGERS PICTURES:
1)

belief, no action
This is Yolanda. She is going camping.
Yolanda hopes it will be nice weather. She believes that crossing her fingers
will bring good luck.
Her hands are full, so she does not cross her fingers.
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2)

no belief, no action
This is Sarah. She is in her classroom at school.
Sarah hopes her spelling test will be easy. She does not believe that crossing
her fingers will bring good luck.
She does not cross her fingers before the test.

3)

belief, action
This is David. He is waiting for the bus.
David hopes his friend will save him a seat. He believes that crossing his
fingers will bring good luck.
He crosses his fingers as he waits for the bus.

4)

no belief, action
This is Erik. He is looking at his mailbox.
Erik hopes there will be a letter for him today. He does not believe that
crossing his fingers will bring good luck.
He crosses his fingers, anyway.
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Appendix E
Informed Consent Document
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Department of Psychology
270-745-2695

WESTERN
KENTUCKY
UNIVERSITY

Western Kentucky University
1 Big Red Way
Bowling Green, KY 42101-3576

Participant Consent Form
Dear Parents,
Your child is invited to participate in a study of children's understanding of beliefs.
This study is being conducted by Dr. Katrina Phelps of Western Kentucky University in
cooperation with your child's school. The aim of our study is to better understand how children
reason about the effects of beliefs on behavior and real world outcomes. W e will compare the
responses children provide across different ages to learn about changes in children's
understanding of beliefs across development. This project will be conducted in a single 20minute session at your child's school, at a time arranged with your child's teacher. W e will
coordinate the session with your child's teacher so that your child will not miss any important
learning activities.
During the session, your child will be interviewed individually and shown a set of
pictures to evaluate and sort. Various questions about beliefs and actions related to good luck
and bad luck will be asked; your child's answers will be recorded and kept confidential by our
research staff. Your child is free to discuss the interview with you, but w e ask children not to
discuss their answers with their classmates. W e also will show children a series of drawings of
boys and girls w h o are engaged in behavior that may bring them good luck or bad luck. We
will ask your child several simple questions about each story and ask them to sort the pictures
into piles. Children are told that there are no right or wrong answers to these questions and to
just say whatever they think. Our experience has been that children find our interview and
picture tasks to be enjoyable and many ask when they can do it again.
W e would like to emphasize that your child's participation in this project is entirely
voluntary. If you or your child decide not to participate, there will be no negative consequence
of any sort for you or your child. Your child may refuse to answer any question and may
withdraw from the study at any time. All information collected in this study will be kept
strictly confidential and will only be accessible to the project staff. All results will be reported
in terms of group averages, and no children will ever be identified by name. A written report of
the group results will be available to you at your child's school upon completion of the study.
The procedures in this study have been reviewed and approved by the Western
Kentucky University Committee for the Protection of Human Research Participants. The
University has filed a form entitled "Assurance of Compliance with D H H S regulations for the
Protection of Human Subjects" with the Department of Health and Human Services. Specific
questions about this study may be directed to Dr. Katrina Phelps at (270) 745-4311. Feel free
to call if you have any concerns; w e will be happy to provide you with further information.

fc
PAYS
Equal Education artd Employment Opportunities
H c a n n g Impaired O n l y : 270-745-5^89

The Spirit Makes the Master
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We hope that you will allow your child to participate in our study. We promise
to make it a pleasant experience and to schedule our sessions in cooperation with your
child's teacher. Please fill out your child's name and date of birth, and your child's
teacher's name below. To indicate consent, sign your name, and fill in the date at the
bottom of the form. When your child returns this letter to the teacher, regardless of
whether you respond yes or no, your child will receive a Western Kentucky University
"Big Red" pencil.
Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely.

Assistant Professor

Western Kentucky University
Participant Consent Form

Child's name:

:

Date of birth:

Teacher's name:

No. I do not give my consent for my child to participate in this study.

Yes. I have read the information provide about this study, and give my consent
for my child to participate in the individual interviews that are a part of the study
conducted by Dr. Katrina Phelps of Western Kentucky University. I understand that I
may withdraw my child from the study at any time without penalty.

Parent's signature:

Date:

